The year is 2024 — Africa’s big election year. The continent would be facing a significant test, with around twenty-one (21) countries heading to the polls to fill executive and legislative seats at various government levels. 2023’s election scorecard was not demonstrably impressive, with records of electoral technology failure in Nigeria, concerns over electoral integrity in Sierra Leone, irregularities in Gabon (which provided a basis for military intervention), and restriction of civic and political rights during the Zimbabwe election. There was an outlier – Liberia, where the incumbent President George Weah conceded defeat in a remarkably competitive contest. What should we expect in the Africa 2024 elections?
Africa’s big election year is here amidst significant challenges, including the rising spate of unconstitutional changes of government, constitutional limit extensions by incumbents, and the weakened rule of law, indicating democratisation decline. 2024 is an opportunity to reinvent the wheel, with many countries holding elections. These include regional powerhouses like Ghana, South Africa and Rwanda. Mali and Burkina Faso have already postponed their own elections. Senegal’s February 24 presidential election was initially postponed but is now scheduled to hold on March 24 after the Constitutional Council’s insistence.
The drive and implications of elections differ across contexts.
Elections are attractive to ‘modern states’, such that even autocratic regimes participate in such exercises to legitimise their regime and create a façade of public acceptability. Yet, what matters is not elections per se but the quality of the election as evidenced by its predictably cyclical nature, freeness, fairness, credibility, competitiveness and conclusiveness.
Out of the 21 African countries expected to head to the polls in 2024, just 6 are considered electoral democracies – where citizens can deploy voting rights in multi-party, free and fair elections along with freedom to associations and expression. As the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index Rank and Free and Fair Elections Index also indicate, countries like Ghana, Botswana, and Senegal will enter the upcoming elections with high levels of competition.
In contrast, the electoral competition rankings and indices for Guinea, South Sudan, and Tunisia suggest that credible elections may be too much to ask. The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index Rank measures the extent to which political leaders are elected under comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections while also ensuring the protection of freedoms of association and expression. On the other hand, the V-Dem Free and Fair Elections Index measures the extent to which election violence, government intimidation, fraud, large irregularities, and vote buying are absent. In both measures, a score of 1 signifies a desirable position, whereas a score of 0 indicates the least position.
The figures from both measures raise concern about whether the Africa 2024 elections will offer any democratic benefits at all. Nevertheless, the possible results point towards two directions. While the elections may have opportunities to enhance the democratic credentials of the continent, there is also the potential for a shift towards more authoritarian conditions if autocratic incumbents endure or if they manage to install stooges.
In what has been regarded as an unimpressive start, 2024’s first election in Comoros led to the victory of President Azali Assoumani, a former military ruler who had just won his fourth term. The election result had been rejected by opposition candidates, sparking a violent reaction that resulted in the death of one and injury to twenty-five people. Opposition members claimed that electoral ballots were pre-marked to benefit Assoumani. In Senegal, President Macky Sall’s attempts to delay the election through a legislation had been met by violent protests and demonstrations, leading to the death of three. Sall claimed the delay was necessary to clear disputes from the electoral register, but there is a widespread belief that Sall postponed the election for fear that his Benno Bokk Yaakaar (BBY) would be defeated in the polls. Following the Constitutional Council’s declaration that the postponement was unlawful, the election is now scheduled to be held on March 24.
In Mali, the February 4 and 18 elections, which were meant to restore civilian rule, had also been postponed due to ‘technical reasons’ in connection with a new constitution and the electoral list. At the same time, in Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore is backtracking on the initial promise to hold a presidential election in July 2024, citing security concerns. Meanwhile, in Tunisia, there are fears that democracy is endangered due to the shift towards authoritarianism, as President Kais Saied has arrogated excessive powers to himself.
Yet, the atmosphere in other African countries points towards a more positive outlook. In South Africa, the election shows a prospect of constructive competitiveness. Youth apathy may define the context of the election if concerted efforts are not made, but early polls suggest that for the first time since 1994, the African National Congress may not win a majority of the votes. This could be a plus for democratic multi-partism in the country. In Mozambique, a leadership change is expected to occur as the incumbent, President Nyusi, cannot run for office due to term limits. Meanwhile, in Ghana, a competitive contest is expected between the current Vice-President, Mahamudu Bawumia and former President John Mahama.
The resurgence of Military coups and regional responses
The resurgence of coups in Africa has underlined the importance of fostering good governance and development, bringing again to the fore the pivotal role positive elections can play as a catalyst for these advancements. Yet democratic processes and development trajectories can be tested during elections due to the high dividends and pressure that they generate. The last decade has seen a myriad of challenges to the democratic competition of power in Africa, including incumbents’ exploitation of the constitution to remain in power and control of lawful campaign activities. The continent has also been plagued by pre and post-election violence and, more recently, a rise in coup d’etat since 2020.
Once a country shifts to military governance, democratisation becomes more difficult. Coupist countries are currently resisting democratisation attempts by postponing elections in their domain. It has also been suggested that the recent decision of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to pull out of ECOWAS may be a strategy to circumvent ECOWAS, which has insisted that the transition to democratic administrations must be short and that coup plotters must not stand in presidential elections.
How sustainable and attractive are elections in Africa?
Amidst concerns about democratic erosion on the African continent, what is the extent of demand for democracy? In an Afrobarometer survey involving 39 African countries, seventy-five per cent (75%) of Africans endorse fair, transparent, and honest elections as the best method for selecting their leaders, with half expressing a strong agreement with this perspective. However, this inclination has diminished over the past decade. Notwithstanding, according to the recent round of the survey, support for election was as high as 73.1% and 71% in Tanzania and Sierra Leone, respectively.
The general representation of citizens’ attitudes towards democracy in Africa has been that of dissatisfaction and disillusionment. Citizens often troop into the streets to support military authorities after they seize power. Why do Africans support elections but also raise support for coupists when they strike? Although elections are perceived to be the best means of choosing leaders, this support must be encouraged by ensuring a free, fair, credible and competitive electoral process.
At present, electoral democracies are few on the continent, and incentives are being created for military power due to ‘institutional coups’ by elected governments. President Ali Bongo thought he was on his way to an unchallengeable third term in office until senior military officers abruptly seized power, saying the election did not meet the conditions of a transparent, credible, and inclusive election. Strangely, ‘institutional coups’ do not attract sanctions from international organisations such as ECOWAS, whose major strategy has been the suspension of coupist countries.
Africa approaches a pivotal election year amid notable challenges. The important year provides an opportunity for a fresh start. Weak and incredible elections that offer predictable outcomes, improbable transition of power and incumbent reinvention offer little benefit to the continent. As the global focus turns to 2024 as the universal year of elections, we hope to see elections characterised by freedom, fairness, credibility, and healthy competition.