Even though the Indonesia-Africa Forum, held in the first three days of September, and attended by three African Heads of State, reawakened the growing criticism against African leaders acting as willing parties to the increasing number of countries organising multilateral summits with the African continent in a way that undermines the rights of African countries to equal diplomatic representation on the international stage, the Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, held between the 4th and 6th of September, was always going to stir a more extensive conversation on the current state of development in African countries, and their relationship with the rest of the world.
The forum, in its ninth edition, was first held in 2000, back when the African Union was referred to as the Organisation of African Unity, and was attended by the Heads of State of 51 African countries. FOCAC is important to both parties for several reasons. For China, it’s an avenue to shape its relationship with Africa across key areas like economics, health, peace and security, education, and culture. It also provides Beijing with a platform to reiterate its strategic regard for the continent and the rest of the global south, which it regularly seeks to associate with, in the pursuit of its national interest. For African countries, the triennial conference is an avenue to connect with the continent’s largest trading partner and make a case for a significant place in China’s action plan, which shapes the dimension of its interest in the continent for the next three years.
Focus of FOCAC 2024
FOCAC 2024 was not different in terms of the significant place it holds for both parties, and this was signified by the now customary presence of almost all African leaders – only the African Union can boast of a larger gathering of African Heads of State. But there are specific realities in the current state of international politics and global economic realities that made the latest forum critical, not only for African countries who went into the conference amid rising chatters about decreasing interest in Africa from Beijing’s policymakers, but also for China, who continue to re-examine the primacy of its strategic interest in an increasingly multipolar global order, amid rising competition for influence on the continent from global powers like the United States that committed $55 billion in new and existing projects to African countries at the US-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022, and other developed countries. At the conference, China made specific commitments and several diplomatic overtures that painted a picture of Africa’s place in its foreign policy direction for, at least, another three years. This piece highlights some of the implications of these moves.
Africa Still Key To Beijing’s Interest
Central to China’s frontline influence in Africa is the strategic role it plays in the continent’s economy. According to the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, between 2000 and 2023, China provided over 1300 loans to African countries worth an estimated $182.3 billion, almost five times the loans provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB) within the same period, making it the continent’s biggest bilateral lender. Even though the first FOCAC was held in 2000, Beijing began to play a more pronounced role on the continent following the launch of its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, designed to recreate the ancient silk road, which has been adopted by 52 African countries. But in the buildup to this year’s forum, there were concerns among African Heads of State that Chinese economic interest in the continent is on the decline. For context, in each of the two forums that followed the launch of its BRI, China committed to $60 billion to fund projects across the continent, however in 2021, its financial commitment fell, for the first time since the expansion, to $40 billion, and in 2022, the value of Chinese loans to African countries reduced to its lowest level in almost twenty years.
Even though China’s shifting domestic reality and its own struggle with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were key to this decreasing financial commitment to Africa, the notion that its economic interest in the continent may be dwindling was not lost on Beijing, and at the conference, it made it a primary obligation to quell this by making a financial pledge of $50.7 billion in credit lines and investments to the continent over the next three years. Some of the key areas this new pledge will focus on includes granting duty-free treatment that covers the entire tariff lines of products from least developed countries across Africa, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the continent, financially.
Importantly, Beijing indicated that a significant portion of this investment will lean heavily on trade relations, as opposed to the usual infrastructural investments that have increased Africa’s debt to China, and raised sustainability concerns. This does not mean China’s focus on infrastructure investment on the continent, which led to the implementation of 21 infrastructure connectivity projects between 2021 and 2024 alone, will stop. In fact, it committed to investing in 30 new infrastructure projects and committed to a synergy between its BRI and AUDA-NEPAD’s second Priority Action Plan to fasttrack the development of its logistical connectivity with Africa, including the creation of new maritime routes and shipping lines for increased trading activities that can boost China’s status as Africa’s largest trading partner, a position it has held for 15 consecutive years.
New Initiatives
Aside from increasing its financial commitment to reassure African leaders of its commitment, China also initiated new measures to deepen and refine its approach to deepening its influence. The first element of this involves increasing its emphasis on soft power to achieve its diplomatic goals on the continent. The second element is a strategic redesign of its financial investments to prioritise green energy. This pivot towards green energy in Africa is not out of place, rather it’s a reaffirmation of the new direction that Beijing significantly hinted at during the Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, a year that the country ramped up its focus on renewable energy, investing in more solar power facilities than the rest of the world combined.
Continued Emphasis On ‘Soft Power’ Initiatives
Unlike major powers like the United States, China’s image among African citizens has always been miles lower than its actual economic and strategic contributions to the continent. Various notions – including controversial ones, like claims that its loans to the continent are a debt-trap; true ones, like poor labour practices and disregard for environmental guardrails by Chinese-owned companies by Chinese-owned companies, and socio-cultural ones, like the deep language barriers between between both parties – have fuelled the perspective of African citizens towards China. Beijing understands this, and it’s why it has invested significantly in improving its image on the continent through soft-power initiatives.
At FOCAC 2024, the country reiterated its commitment to improving this image through several soft-power initiatives in its Beijing Action Plan, which succeeds the Dakar Action Plan of 2021. Some of these include increased partnership on on Chinese language education with the education agencies and institutes of respective African countries, establishing a new China-Africa Regional Cooperation Center on Digital Education with a focus on cultural exchange, launching a new China-Africa 100 Universities Cooperation Plan, and funding training opportunities for at least 60,000 Africans, with priority given to programs geared towards the development of women and youth empowerment, including ensuring thousands of young African professionals receive such training in China. The plan also emphasised the need for increased inter-civilizational exchanges and mutual learning between citizens to deepen cultural exchanges, and enhance the degree of people-to-people ties between both parties.
Similarly, Beijing committed to establishing new cultural projects in Africa like the designation of 2026 as the Year of China-Africa People-to-People Exchanges, and bolster existing flagship ones like the Happy Spring Festival, and the Silk Road Artists’ Rendezvous, the China-Africa Cultural Focus. It also expressed commitment to invest in other areas central to soft-power diplomacy like sports, by investing in the organisation of the African Cup of Nations and providing support for the preparation of African athletes ahead of their participation in global sport competitions. These soft-power investments are strategic because they target the continent’s elite, whose consensus significantly shapes the overall image of China on the continent.
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Increased Green Investments
Another key component of the outcome from FOCAC 2024 is China’s decision to make green infrastructure central to its investments in Africa. Specifically, the emphasis it initially placed on providing loans for major infrastructural projects on the continent will now be directed towards green energy initiatives. At the Forum, China committed to investing in 30 clean energy projects across multiple African countries, placing the global race towards energy transition at the centre of its relationship with the continent. Before now, China has always been a key player in Africa’s green energy resource sector. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to 70 percent of the world’s cobalt, and China currently owns 72 percent of the active cobalt and copper mines in the country. The country also holds strategic investments in other African countries home to critical green energy resources like Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Guinea.
A significant proportion of deals signed at the Forum are targeted towards deepening China’s capacity to expand its investments in Africa’s green energy sector. For example, it signed an agreement to elevate the Tazara railway which runs across Zambia and Tanzania, an infrastructure that when completed, would provide a new route to transport resources like copper and cobalt from Zambia via the Indian Ocean, a strategic alternative to the US-backed Lobito corridor in Angola. Aside from deepening its investment in green energy resources, it also committed to investments in other renewable sources of energy. For example, in Nigeria, its second largest trading partner on the continent, Beijing committed to investing in solar powered public facilities, assembling electric tricycles, and establishing training and testing centres for renewable energy technologies.
Conclusion
China used this year’s FOCAC to reiterate the strategic place that Africa holds in the actualization of its foreign policy objectives by increasing the levels of its financial commitment to the continent. While this new direction is still at least $10 billion short of the 2015 and 2018 peak, it is enough to ease the fear of many African countries that rely significantly on Chinese investments. This, coupled with the increasing competition for influence among other global powers in Africa, means the continent will continue to benefit from China’s ‘romance’, a situation it can exploit to further its own interest in global affairs.
But beyond that, there is an urgent need for African countries to be more strategic in how they accommodate Chinese interests in strategic sectors. For example, one of the biggest factors responsible for the underdevelopment of African countries is their inability to effectively add value to resources. A significant proportion of deals signed at this year’s FOCAC, including those on Chinese investment in the continent’s green energy sector, make little or no effort to tilt this balance.