President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is no stranger to contradictions between his local and foreign affairs. As of the time he ran for President in 2022, the only academic credentials he had to show were his foreign diplomas.

He was voted in as President regardless. It appeared his academic performance in Nigeria mattered less than his foreign results.

So, while the verdict of his performance in government at home in his first year in office is being compiled by various examiners, Dataphyte’s Policy Analyst, Adebayo Abdulrahman, attempts an analysis of the President’s foreign policy.

To achieve a standardised measurement of Tinubu’s performance in diplomacy so far, Adebayo situates him among his historical peers and their diplomatic precedents. This analysis reveals Tinubu’s moderate attempts at economic diplomacy with at least 2 unforced errors. On the broader turbulent waters of diplomacy, his government struggles with balancing principles with pragmatism at the regional and international levels.

Nigeria’s Diplomatic Precedents: 1960-2023

Within the first decade of independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria was already considered a regional power as it had met the preconditions to be called one. But the country was not oblivious to its true potential, including the capacity to expand its sphere of influence beyond the region, serve as the heartbeat of Africa’s development and become the leading figure in the continent’s relationship with the rest of the world. For decades, the country lived up to these expectations – at least to a significant extent as instances that underscore this are replete across the literature of the history of its foreign policy. 

Today, there is little doubt that the country has fallen off from what is considered the ‘golden years’ of its foreign policy. What there is a lack of consensus on is the dynamics of how this fall happened. While some, like former Commonwealth Secretary General, Emeka Anyaoku, credit the timing of the relocation of the country’s foreign affairs ministry from Lagos in 1992 for the fall of the golden years of its foreign affairs ministry, others, like Professor Akinjide Osuntokun, believe the golden years of its foreign policy came to an end with the exit of the Olusegun Obasanjo administration in 2007. The debate here is not about whether there was a fall or not, rather it’s one that seeks to separate the decline of the golden years of the country’s foreign affairs ministry from that of its overall foreign policy which happened years later. However, the occurrence of both can’t be separated as they are deeply intertwined.  

Historically, Nigeria’s foreign policy is deeply entwined with the personality of its president at every point in time. This explains why the evolution of its foreign policy follows the pattern of changes in the office of its presidency. Following the exit of Obasanjo in 2007, his successor, Umaru Yar’adua introduced a new dynamic to the country’s foreign policy that shifted its thrust away from Africa, for the first time, to putting its citizens first. This shift from Afrocentrism to citizen diplomacy did not materialise into gains for the country’s foreign policy realities or even the citizens it sought to put first. 

Yar’adua’s successor, Jonathan came into office at a time of deep economic concerns. So it came as no surprise that his administration had a strong inclination towards economic foreign policy with an intent to attract foreign direct investments into the country. When he was voted out of office in 2015, the country’s poor economic state was a dominant headline. 

Before his election in 2015, Muhammadu Buhari’s first outing as Nigeria’s military leader was marked with several controversies including the breakdown of diplomatic relations with Britain over the Umar Dikko case and his refusal to sign the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brown card system for the free movement of citizens and goods within the subregion. 

But his eight-year democratic outing had a slightly different return. His administration leveraged the country’s regional power to interfere in political crises in Gambia; disbursed funds in 2015 to support the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which was launched with three other Lake Chad countries, Chad, Cameroon and Niger, and strengthened bilateral relations with China leading to increased infrastructure investment in the country.

Albeit, all these gains were accompanied by an equal, if not deeper, share of negatives. His administration lacked conviction and was one of the last to join the African Continental Free Trade Area, undermining the country’s influence in the continental integration move. He also failed to provide sufficient support to the MNJTF leading to the withdrawal of over 1,000 troops by Chad, and its foreign policy centrepiece appeared to be Niger-centric as opposed to Afrocentric. 

Tinubplomacy: A Turbulent First-Year 

In July last year, barely six weeks into his administration, President Bola Tinubu was elected the new chairperson of ECOWAS. This election was lauded as a major development by his aides as part of efforts to shore up popular support on the heels of his emergence through one of the ‘weakest’ democratic mandates for a President in the country’s history. But this only buttresses how far off the country has fallen, because, hitherto, chairing ECOWAS was a norm for Nigerian Presidents as all but three of the country’s leaders have held the position since its inception. 

“Without democracy there’s no governance, there’s no freedom, there’s no rule of law. We will not allow coup after coup in the West Africa sub-region,” Tinubu said in his acceptance speech amid thunderous applause, adding that “we didn’t give our soldiers resources, we didn’t invest in them, in their boots, in their training to violate the freedom of the people. To turn their guns against civil authorities is a violation of the principles upon which they were hired, which is to defend the sovereignty of their nations.”

Two weeks after this declaration, soldiers in Niger carried out a coup and sacked the democratically elected President, Mohamed Bazoum representing, the first major foreign policy test of his administration and an avenue to show that his ECOWAS acceptance speech was more than just words. 

It is important to note that even without the ECOWAS chair, a coup in Niger will always fall within the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy because of the dynamics of the connection between both countries. For instance, the border between them is Nigeria’s largest and this area is the hotspot of the Boko Haram insurgency, a nagging security crisis lasting over two decades.

A few hours after the coup, Tinubu condemned it and insisted that ECOWAS will not tolerate any situation that incapacitates the democratically-elected government of its members. After attempts to mediate failed, the bloc, led by Nigeria, imposed economic sanctions, including a no-fly zone and border closure against the country. This sanction was followed by the suspension of Niger, alongside Mali and Burkina Faso, two of the countries under military rule in the sub-region. 

Even though the ban and sanctions were meant to serve as a deterrence, they apparently failed. In January, the three countries announced their withdrawal from the regional bloc sparking a major diplomatic crisis. The three countries also announced the formation of a new military bloc known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AoSS, or AES in French). The implication of this was not lost on ECOWAS, especially Tinubu, as their exit could mark the beginning of the organisation’s irreversible collapse. 

In February, following a meeting of the ECOWAS in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, it announced the reversal of the sanctions placed on the three countries, urging them to rescind their decision to leave. Speaking at the summit, Tinubu acknowledged the failure of the immediate approach deployed under his leadership to resolve the crisis, noting that they must re-examine their current approach to restore constitutional order in these countries. In sharp contrast to his strongly worded statement at the beginning of the crisis, Tinubu implored the countries to reconsider their decision to leave the bloc, noting that they should “not perceive our organisation as the enemy”.

While the reversal of this sanction is yet to materialize in a change in course for these countries, a bigger concern is that citizens of these countries, especially Nigeriens, who were the most impacted by the sanctions believe their decision to leave the bloc is justified.